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INTRODUCTION 
Chantal Mouffe introduces The Challenge of Carl Schmitt by asking, "Why 
should we read Carl Schmitt today?" 1 How one answers this question depends 
on who the "we" is. Mouffe's introduction summarizes approaches to Schmitt 
taken in a volume whose authors are political theorists "all identified with the 
Left."2 These authors read Schmitt in order to gain "insights that can be used to 
* Associate, Akennan, Senterfitt and Edison, P.A., Miami, Florida. B.A., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1985; Ph.D., Cornell University, 1993; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1999. 
I. Chantal Mouffe, Introduction: Schmitt's Challenge [hereinafter Mouffe, Introduction], in 
THE CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITI 1 (Chantal M·ouffe ed., 1999) [hereinafter CHALLENGE oF CARL 
ScHMITT]. This question has been posed in one form or another by many recent commentators on 
the works of Car] Schmitt. See, e.g.; David Dyzenhaus, Introduction: Why Carl Schmitt [hereinafter 
Dyzenhaus, Introduction], in LAw AS PoLITics: CARL ScHMrrr' s CRmQuE oF LIBERALISM 1 (David 
Dyzenhaus ed., 1998) [hereinafter LAW AS PoLITics]; JoH~ P. McCoRMICK, CARL ScHMrrr's CRI-
TIQUE OF LIBERALISM: AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 11·15 (1997) (hereinafter McCORMICK, 
ScHMITT's CRmQuE) (posing the introductory question: "Liberalism and Fascism - Or, Why Carl 
Schmitt?"). The editors of a special iss_ue of the journal TELOs devoted to Carl Schmitt begin their 
introduction with, "'Why Schmitt? Why Now?" Paul Piccone and G.L. Ulmen, Introduction to Carl 
Schmitt, 72, TELos 3 (1987). . 
2. Mouffe, Introduction, s~pra note 1, at 1. Not all of those who advocate a revival of inter-
est in Schmitt are associated with the political ]eft. Some of Schmitt's current defenders use his 
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rethink liberal democracy with a view to strengthening its institutions."3 In this 
essay, I address Mouffe's question from the perspective of a different "we" -
that of legal scholarship. In answering Mouffe's question, I also tweak it be-
cause I think Mouffe's question answers an anterior question that she does not 
explicitly pose: in the case of Carl Schmitt, the leading legal theorist for the 
Third Reich,4 I believe it is appropriate that we first ask whether we should 
bother reading him at all. 
In the Anglo-American context, the reception of Schmitt's work has fo-
cused on two topics: his influence on Central European leftists, especially the 
Frankfurt School, 5 and the potential uses to which contemporary theorists might 
put his critique of liberalism. The two issues are related: contemporary leftists 
now investigate the reasons why leftists of Schmitt's generation were so inter-
ested - and commented so positively - on Schmitt's works.6 Ellen Kennedy, 
whose articles on and translations of Schmitt's work have contributed greatly to 
the recent revival of interest in Schmitt, believes she has discovered the source 
of earlier interest in Schmitt's work, arguing that "the most cogent and coherent 
critique of liberal institutions in this century was developed by Schmitt. "7 Ac-
cording to Kennedy, Schmitt's legal and political theory filled a gap in left-wing 
writings to attack the political left. G.L. Ulmen, for example, takes to task the American authors of 
recent books critical of Schmitt, attributing their hostility to Schmitt to the "existential anxiety ... of 
many trying to remain on the 'Left' after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular, and commu-
nism, in general." According to Ulmen, their criticisms of Schmitt resort to recycled versions of 
liberalism, social democracy, and anti-fascism. G.L. Ulmen, {(Integrative Jurisprudence" and Other 
Misdemeanors, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1107, 1108 (1999) (reviewing PETER CARL CALDWELL, PoPULAR 
SovEREIGNTY AND ruE CRISIS oF GERMAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE THEORY AND PRAcncE OF 
WEIMAR CoNsTITUTIONALISM (1997)); DAVID DvzENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL 
ScHMI'I"t, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) {hereinafter DYZENHAus, LEGAL-
ITY AND LEGmMACY ]. Ellen Kennedy now enthusiastically reviews books that are critical of 
Schmitt, see Ellen Kennedy, The Politics of Law in Weimar Germany, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1079, 1084-
92 ( 1999) (praising CALDWELL, supra, and DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, supra, as "ex-
citing, intelligent and provocative books") [hereinafter Kennedy, The Politics of Law]. However, 
her first major essay on Carl Schmitt was received as an attack on the left-wing Frankfurt School. 
Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, 71 TELos 37 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, 
Carl Schmitt]. The responses published in the same issue include: Martin Jay, Reconciling the Irrec-
oncilable? Rejoinder to Kennedy 71 TELOS 67 ( 1987); Alfons So liner, Beyond Carl Schmitt: Politi-
cal Theory in the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 81 ( 1987); Ulrich K. PreuB, The Critique of German 
Liberalism: Reply to Kennedy, 71 TELOS 97 (1987). Kennedy responded, Ellen Kennedy, Carl 
Schmitt and the Frankfurt School: A Rejoinder, 73 TELOS 101 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, 
Rejoinder]. 
3. Mouffe, Introduction, supra note 1, at 1. 
4. ANDRES KoENEN, DER FALL CARL ScHMin, SEIN AUFSTIEG zuM "KRoNJURISTEN DES 
DRITTEN REICHEs" (1995); JosEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL ScHMirr: THEORIST FOR THE REICH 
(1983). 
5. The debate in the United States about the extent of Schmitt's influence on the Frankfurt 
School began in earnest with Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2. TELOS has since become the 
major source for new translations of Schmitt and for new English-language commentaries on his 
writings. 
6. Kennedy notes Schmitt's influence on Walter Benjamin, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neu-
mann, and Jiirgen Habennas, all associated with the Frankfurt School. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, 
supra note 2. Ulmen emphasizes Haberrnas' recognition of Schmitt as a "legitimate pupil" of Max 
Weber. Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1127-28. 
7. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 39. 
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theory, supplementing the economic and social theory of Karl Marx by analyz-
ing the condition of the liberal state under 201h-century capitalism. 8 
But the revival of interest in Schmitt is somewhat mysterious, especially as 
so many of the theorists who now advocate a reappraisal of his significance 
. . . 
stress that they abhor his politics and reje.ct his conclusions. 9 Indeed, Schmitt's 
perspective on liberalism is unusual because his opposition to modem mass 
politics and parliamentary democracy enables him to be utterly merciless in his 
attacks on the assumptions, the aspirations, and the techniques of the modem 
liberal state. Moreover, the sudden rush to Schmitt remains puzzling because 
other Gennan legal positivists of the Weimar era offered equally searching criti-
ques of liberalism. Hans Kelsen, the most influential legal positivist of that era, 
did so from a centrist position. Herman Heller drew on the German social dem-
ocratic tradition in his analysis of the political structures of Gern1any' s first par-
liamentary democracy. The revival of interest in Schmitt is thus encouraging 
not as an end in itself but as an indication of a new openness among North 
American scholars to the German legal positivist tradition. 
The first part of this essay is divided into three sections. Part I begins by 
outlining Schmitt's biography and tracing his intellectual and professional de-
velopment. It then assesses Schmitt's place in the context of German legal the-
ory in the first half of the 20th century. It concludes by recounting the unlikely 
re-emergence of Schmitt as a political and legal theorist whose work is touted 
for its critique of political liberalism. 
Part II returns to the question of whether we should read Carl Schmitt today 
and what useful lessons we might derive from his writings. This Part details the 
various reasons the writers under review here have given for Schmitt's contin-
ued relevance.10 While the articles collected in lLlW as Politics generally assess 
Schmitt's importance as a historical figure and his continuing impact on Gertnan 
8. ld. at 41-42. In the second part of his book, entitled "Carl Schmitt in America," 
Scheuerman devotes three chapters to a discussion of the diffusion of Carl Schmitt's ideas into 
American political theory through the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich A. Hayek, and Hans 
Morgenthau. WILLIAM E. ScHEUERMAN, CARL ScHMn"l': THE END OF LAW 181-251 (1999). While 
this part of'Scheuennan's book begins the very important work of assessing Schmitt's actual influ-
ence and importance, it is the least convincing part of his work on Schmitt, based as it must be on 
tenuous biographical connections, inferences drawn from the availability of Schmitt's writings and 
topical affinities, and the fine art of divining influence. See e.g., id. at 197-98 (demonstrating the 
existence of a connection between Schmitt and Schumpeter, but not demonstrating the extent of 
Schmitt's influence). John P. McCormick interprets Scheuerman's work as an attempt to "explicate 
[the] subterranean relationship between liberalism and fascism .... , McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRI-
TIQUE, supra note 1, at 14. McConnick thus provides an additional ground for reviving S-chmitt, but 
even Scheuennan does not really seem to be interested in showing a fundamental theoretical affinity 
between liberalism and fascism. Rather~ Scheuettnan indicates the need to investigate the extent to 
which liberal theory might be indebted to Schmitt so that liberals can be· on guard against the impli-
cations of Schmittian theory. 
9. See discussion infra accompanying notes 111-14, of the views of some of the contributors 
to both THE CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITT and LAw AS POLITICS. 
10. In discussing the two collections of essays, I have focused on the question of Schmitt's 
relevance to contemporary political and legal theory. Accordingly, I devote relatively little space to 
the essays included in those collections that address other aspects of Schmitt's writings or assess his 
relationship to other thinkers. 
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politics and constitutional law, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt argues for the 
more general applicability of Schmitt's critique of Rawlsian political liberalism. 
Scheuennan takes an entirely different approach in Carl Schmitt: The End of· 
Law, focusing on Schmitt's critique of liberalism for its inability to justify the 
government's use of discretionary power in realms where legal nortns un-
derdetermine the outcome of particular conflicts. Scheuennan shows Schmitt's 
importance in the context of the contemporary Atnerican critique of liberal juris-
prudence, which has often focused on the failure of constitutional democracy to 
achieve its aim of guaranteeing the functioning of a rational, predictable legal 
system that provides equal justice for all. 
In what follows, I fault Mouffe and some of the authors she includes in The 
Challenge of Carl Schmitt for positing Schmitt's importance as a political theo-
rist rather than demonstrating that importance. Dyzenhaus' collection, by con-
trast, is far more convincing in showing Schmitt's importance in Gennan 
constitutional history and the continuing impact of his thought on Gennan con-
stitutional theory and on German politics. Scheuerman, as well as many of the 
authors collected in Law as Politics, argues that Schmitt is best read as an object 
lesson - as a dramatic example of the dangers of sacrificing liberal democracy 
for stability and order. I share their assessment, as well as their conclusion that 
Schmitt is most usefully read in conjunction with Hans Kelsen, Hennann Heller, 
Rudolf Smend, and Schmitt's other interlocutors from the Weimar period. 11 
These other Weimar thinkers developed their legal theories in the face of the 
same problems that Schmitt confronted. Their conclusions are equally instruc-
tive for contemporary theory, and they, unlike Schmitt, chose to support democ-
racy over fascism. 
I. 
WHO wAS CARL SCHMITI' 
A. A Brief Biographical Sketch 
As discussions of Carl Schmitt's scholarship focus on the varying accounts 
of the significance of Schmitt's collaboration with Nazism to an assessment of 
his writings, Schmitt's biography is only slightly less controversial than those 
writings. Schmitt was born in 1888 in a small town in the German Rhineland; 
he died in the same small town in 1985. 12 He earned his law degree in 1910 
and, in 1914, completed his Habilitationschrift, a post-doctoral dissertation that 
qualifies its author for an academic career. Schmitt thus received his training 
during the heyday of legal positivism, which thrived in the Gern1an universities 
of the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic. 13 He worked for Germany's mili-
tary government at the end of World War I and then taught at leading Gern1an 
universities during the 1920s. By the end of that decade, Schmitt had become a 
11. Unfortunately, the writings of these authors are largely unavailable in English. Kelsen's 
legal theory is available, however, in HANS l<ELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL 
THEORY (B.L Paulson and S.L. Paulson trans., 1992). 
12. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
13. BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
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leading legal advisor to the authoritarian governments that oversaw the collapse 
of the Weimar Republic. Later, Schmitt defended the actions of Chancellor 
Franz von Papen, who seized control of the Prussian government in July 1932, 
in a sort of coup d'etat (the "Preuj3enschlag") in which the federal government 
displaced the elected Social-Democratic leaders of Germany's largest state. 
Schmitt's support of von Papen;s coup set the stage for one of those rare 
occasions when legal theorists face off in a high-stakes game of power politics. 
The legality of von Papen's actions were tested before the German Supreme 
Court in Leipzig. Although Kelsen did not participate in the proceedings, his 
writings clearly shaped the arguments put forward by Hans Nawiasky, one of 
the lawyers representing the ousted Prussian government. 14 Hermann Heller 
also represented Prussia. 15 In support of von Papen's government, Schmitt ar-
gued that Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution empowered the President (and 
the Chancellor acting under emergency powers granted him by the President) to 
take extreme measures in order to check radical political parties. The Supreme 
Court was not entirely convinced, but it did not reinstate the independent Pros-
sian government.-16 Since the Social Democratic government of Prussia had 
provided a significant bulwark against the rise of Nazism,. historians often point 
to the PreujJenschlag as a critical turning point in the Weimar Republic's 
demise. 
Schmitt did not join the Nazi Party until May 1933, as his natural political 
inclinations favored a more old-fashioned authoritarianism. 17 Soon after joining 
14. PREU8EN CONTRA REICH VOR OEM STAATSGERICHTSHOF: STENOGRAMM.BERICHT DER VER-
HANDLUNGEN VOR OEM STAATSGERICHTSHOF IN LEIPZIG VOM 10. BJS 14. UNO VOM 17. 0KTOBER 
1932 (2nd ed. 1976). See BENDERSKY, supra note 4t at 160-71 (discussing Schmitt's role and Kel-
sen's influence on the proceedings); CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 172-73 (same); Kennedy, The 
Politics of Lawt supra note 2, at 1084-92 (summarizing Dyzenhaus' account of the proceedings and 
concluding that only Heller's theories provided a means of preserving the Weimar constitution). 
15. Kennedy, The Politics of Law, supra note 2, at 1086. 
16. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 37-38, n. 2. G.L. Ulmen criticizes Peter Carl 
Caldwell and David Dyzenhaus for treating Schmitt as an ally of von Papen when Schmitt was 
actually associated with Kurt von Schleicher, s authoritarian attempt to exclude the Nazis from gov-
ernment Ulrnen, supra note 2, at lllJ, 1118, 1124. However, Ulmen does not address Schmitt's 
role in defending von Papen' s actions before the Gennan Supreme Court. 
17. George Schwab, one of Schmitt's translators, argues rather pathetically that Carl Schmitt 
could not have shared the ideas of the Nazis in 1932 because at that point, as an advisor to Ger-
many's existing authoritarian government, he advocated the exclusion of extremists on both ends of 
the political spectrum from participation in politics. Schwab, Introduction, in CARL ScHMnT, THE 
CONCEPT OF THE PoLITICAL 14, n. 28 (George Schwab trans.,. 1996) [hereinafter SCHMI'IT, THE CoN-
CEPT] .. Schmitt was thus disappointed that President Paul von Hindenburg "labored under the impact 
of legalist doctrines," and would not "eliminate the political challenges" facing his government. /d. 
at 15. While this does indicate that Schmitt favored traditional forms of authoritarian government 
over Nazi-style totalitarianism, it by no means indicates that Schmitt's ideas could not be reconciled 
with those of the Nazis. Schmitt believed that states had to be empowered to make vital decisions in 
times of crisis in the interest of stability. In 1932, Schmitt believed that the state needed to eliminate 
fascists and ,communists from the political spectrum. In 1933, he believed that the Nazi state needed 
to eliminate its enemies, right, left and center. Scheuennan adopts a slightly more generous view 
regarding Schmitt's association with Nazism, arguing that Schmitt's authoritarian theory of the total 
state "made him vulnerable: to National Socialism." S.CHEUERMAN, supra note 8, ,at 86. But 
Scheuennan also argues that '''Schmitt's marriage to Nazism stems immanently from core elements 
of his jurisprudence." ld. at 115 (emphasis in original). Schwab also argues that Schmitt's anti-
Semitic remarks were insincere; that he· was merely attempting to ingratiate himself with the Nazis. 
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the Nazi Party, however, Schmitt was awarded a professorship at Gertnany's 
leading university in Berlin, as well as the editorship of Germany's leading legal 
publication, Die deutsche Juristen-Zeitung. 18 Schmitt's collaboration with the 
Nazis was short-lived, lasting from March 1933 until December 1936. 19 Conse-
quently, some of those who advocate Schmitt's continued importance urge us 
not to judge the work of a prolific theorist whose thought continued to develop, 
beginning around the time of World War I and continuing into the Space Age, 
on the basis of one 45-month period.20 But during that time Schmitt authored 
four books and published over 50 essays in academic and political joumals.21 
Moreover, Schmitt was a reactionary critic of the Weimar Republic long before 
he joined the Nazi Party, and, although his feud with elements within the Nazi 
leadership forced him to surrender some of his positions, Schmitt's writings up 
until 1945 do not bear out his post-war claims that he had joined the opposition 
after 1936.22 As Scheuerman puts it, "[t]he overwhelming tone of Schmitt's 
GEORGE ScHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE ExcEPTION: AN lNTRonucnoN TO THE PoLITICAL IDEAS 
OF CARL SCHMITI' BETWEEN 1931 AND 1936, 134-38 (1970). 
18. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 113. 
19. Paul Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism [hereinafter Hirst, Schmitt's Decisionism], in CHAL-
LENGE OF CARL ScHMnT, supra note 1, at 7-8. Hirst's essay is an updated version of an article he 
published in Telos 12 years earlier. Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism, 72 TELOS 15 (1987). After 
December, 1936, Schmitt was forced out of several of his positions after he was criticized in an 
official SS publication, Das Schwarze Korps. Tracy Strong, Foreward: Dimensions of the New 
Debate around Carl Schmitt, in ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at ix-x. The story of 
Schmitt's fall into disfavor with elements of the SS is recounted in BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 230-
242. In the original Gern1an version of her essay on Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, Ken-
nedy described Schmitt's association with Nazism as a mere "caprice." Jay, supra note 2, at 72 
(criticizing Kennedy, Schwab, and Bendersky for attempting to redeem Schmitt as a brilliant con-
servative theorist by distinguishing his Weimar writings from those written during the Third Reich). 
20. Ulmen accuses Dyzenhaus and Caldwell of distorting Schmitt's writings by finding too 
much continuity in his thought. Thus Ulmen finds it significant that, during the Weimar Republic, 
Schmitt did not write about the importance of a mythical leader who could resolve social conflicts in 
industrial society. Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1112, 1118. Ulmen would distinguish Schmitt's views 
from Nazism because his crucial friend/enemy distinction was not explicitly racial and his racism 
was not biological. ld. at 1109, n. 10. 
21. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 113. These writings included crude attacks on Jews and 
foreigners and enthusiastic defenses of the racial Nuremberg laws. ld. at 113-14. 
22. /d. at 1, 4. Some commentators prefer to divide Schmitt's career into three distinct peri-
ods: the Schmitt of the teens and twenties, the Schmitt of the Nazi period, and the post-Nazi Schmitt. 
Agostino Carrino, Carl Schmitt and European Juridical Science, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITT, 
supra note 1, at 180, 186. While there were undeniable shifts in the focus of Schmitt's work 
throughout his career, I believe that Schmitt's writings generally evidence the continuity of his 
thought. Carrino acknowledges this continuity with respect to Schmitt's legal writings. Id. at 187. 
See also, Strong, supra note 19, at xxv ("It seems to me relatively clear that in most aspects of his 
thought Schmitt's understanding of law and the world did not change throughout his life. This 
includes at least some aspects of his open anti-Semitism during the period 1933-1936. "); Jean-Fran-
~ois Kervegan, Carl Schmitt and "World Unity", in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMI'IT, supra note 1, at 
54, 55-56 (noting that Schmitt began developing the major themes of his post-war writings as early 
as the 1920s). Ingeborg Maus argues that Schmitt consistently advocated the same sort of social 
function for the political system, while acknowledging "situation-specific modifications of Schmitt's 
juristic constructs." Ingeborg Maus, The 1933 "Breakt' in Carl Schmitt's Theory, in LAw AS PoLIT-
Ics, supra note 1, at 196, 199. She concludes that "Schmitt's theory coincides with the interest of 
those parts of the bourgeoisie that did not autonomously bring fascism into existence in 1933, but 
that for a long time successfully used fascism for its own purposes, only to be cheated by it in the 
long run." /d. at 212. John P. McCorn1ick argues that there was a break in Schmitt's theory of 
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postwar writings is fundamentally unrepentant. Schmitt's recently published di-
aries document the depth of his anti-Semitism well after the Nazi defeat."23 In 
any case, as I indicate below, Schmitt is read today precisely for his writings of 
the '20s and '30s, the period when he was most engaged in advocating the re-
placement of Germany's existing parliamentary democracy with a dictatorship. 
Whether or not his brief association with Nazism defines Schmitt's career, it 
certainly defines that portion of his career during which he generated the writ-
ings that are today celebrated for their critique of liberalism. 
B. Schmitt's Place in German Legal Theory 
1. The Positivist Tradition 
Legal positivism has never enjoyed widespread favor in this country, but 
our rejection of the legal positivist tradition has lacked nuance. In his extremely 
useful book on German legal theory, Peter Carl Caldwell distinguishes the Ger-
man tradition of statutory positivism from sociological positivism, which links 
law to a community's social practices,24 and from H.L.A. Hart's statist positiv-
ism,25 which identifies law with nonns posited by legal authority or produced 
through legal procedures.26 For statutory positivists, a statute, duly approved by 
the legislature, is the highest expression of the sovereign will. So long as legis-
lation reflects the will of a sovereign body formed in confortnity with constitu-
tional nonns, the legislation establishes legal nortns that stand above the 
constitution. Gertnan legal positivism first emerged as a means of justifying the 
legal authoritarianism of Bismarck's Kaiserreich, but the leading practitioners of 
legal positivism during the Weimar Republic supported the Republic, although 
with varying degrees of conviction. 27 
dictatorship. But that break occurred very early, between 1921 and 1922. Compare CARL ScHMnT, 
DIE DIKTATUR: VoN DEN ANFANGEN DES MODERNEN SOUVERANITATSGEDANKENS BIS ZUM 
PRoLETARISCHEN KLASSENKAMPF (1921) [hereinafter ScHMITI", DIE DIKTATUR], with CARL 
ScHMt'l"r, PoLJTISCHE THEoLooiE: VIER KAPITEL ZUR LEHRE voN DER SoURVERANITAT (1922) [here· 
inafter ScHMnT, PoLmSCHE THEOLOGIE]. The effect of the break, according to McCorntick, was to 
transfonn Schmitt from a "brilliant Weimar conservative" into a "Weimar fascist." John P. McCor-
mick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers [hereinaf-
ter McConnick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship], in LAw AS PoLITICS, supra note 1, at 217, 236. See 
discussion infra accompanying notes 168-175. Ulmen and Bendersky argue for a different kind of 
continuity in Schmitt's thought, treating him as a conservative, never a fascist, throughout his career. 
Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1115; Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolution, 
72 TELOS 27 (1987). 
23. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 175. 
24. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMANN, LAw AND sociETY: AN lNTR.ooucr1oN 3-5 (1977) (setting 
out, as the object of the sociology of law, the authoritative description of public rules). 
25. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT oF LAw (1961). 
26. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 3. 
27. See e.g., id. at 65 (discussing Gerhard Achschutz's evolution from a defender of constitu-
tional monarchism into one of the most important commentators on the Weimar constitution and the 
laws of the Weimar Republic), 123 ("It took at least ten years for [Rudolf] Smend to become recon-
ciled to the Weimar Republic."), 129-30 (noting in Heller's attempt to articulate a social democratic 
politics of nationalism a tendency to adopt uncritically biological notions of race and suspicion of 
internationalism, both associated with the anti-democratic forces in Weimar). 
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Legal positivism generally rejects the theory, based in natural law, that 
grounds legal norms within a larger moral norn1ati ve system. The challenge for 
German legal positivism was to justify existing legal norms without subordinat-
ing those norms to universalizing moral claims. Hans Kelsen, the Austrian legal 
theorist whose writings dominated Gertnan legal theory during the Weimar Re-
public, acknowledged this difficulty by positing the existence of certain basic 
legal norms which, while not dependent for their existence on moral norms, 
could be subjected to moral critique.28 In the United States, Kelsen's theory 
failed political litmus tests because, although Kelsen personally supported par-
liamentary democracy, his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him 
to avoid connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory. Una-
ble to reconcile the privileging of a particular political perspective with the radi-
cal epistemological relativism that informed all of his work, Kelsen created a 
system in which the legal constraints on state action are purely formaL Any 
action by a state official is valid so long as the official was authorized to take 
that action. 29 Of course, such action can still be subjected to external norn1ative 
critique, but Kelsen' s theory did not seem to American legal theorists to provide 
a sufficiently robust defense of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against 
abuses of the law by fascist or totalitarian governments. 
Schmitt took a very different .approach from Kelsen, grounding legal norms 
in the existence of a unified, homogeneous people. Schmitt rejected Kelsen's 
complex system of legal rules balanced within the bounds of potential external 
normative critique and replaced it in his own theoretical system with an act of 
popular will. 30 Schmitt stood out .among his contemporaries through his strenu-
ous advocacy of the establishment of legal detenninacy by a homogenous judici-
ary committed to the stability of the existing state. 31 His commitment to 
homogeneity was no mere theoretical stance, for he endorsed the expulsion of 
Jews and political radicals from the Gerrrtan civil service and advocated a simi-
lar ethnic cleansing within the ranks of German jurists.32 Despite his collabora-
tion with the Nazis, however, Schmitt was no simple-minded racist or 
nationalist, and both his peers and contemporary theorists recognize that Schmitt 
had a keen eye for the vulnerabilities of modem parliamentary democracy. A 
further exploration of the main themes of Schmitt's political theory is required 
in order to render comprehensible the attraction of this anti-democratic thinker 
to contemporary theorists interested in criticizing liberal political theory . 
• 
2. Schmitt's Central Themes 
As a young adult, Schmitt witnessed the destruction of both his generation 
and the dynasty to which he had sworn allegiance during the First World War. 
28. See id. at 88-96, 116 (providing a synthetic overview of Kelsen' s explication of the basic 
no·...,...nn). 
29. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at 11. 
30. See CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 1 16-18. 
31. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
32. /d. at 17 (citing CARL ScHMITT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, VoLK: DIE DREIOLIEDERUNG DER 
PouTISCHEN EINJ-IEIT 45 (1933)) [hereinafter ScHMJIT, STAAT, BEwEGUNG, VoLK]. 
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It is thus not surprising that his writings consistently reveal an obsession with 
order and a commitment to the preservation of the security of the existing 
state.33 After World War II, Schmitt turned his attention to global political is-
sues and his thought expanded to encompass even broader topics. 34 For the 
purposes of this essay, however, I shall focus on the central themes of Schmitt's 
early writings, those that have attracted the attention of contemporary political 
and legal theorists. 35 
Most contemporary commentators on Schmitt focus on his critique of liber-
alism and his rejection of pluralism.36 By "pluralism," Schmitt means the theo-
ries of society that focus on the multiplicity of associations that any particular 
individual might value. For Schmitt, only the state can serve as the decisive and 
sovereign association. 37 What distinguishes the state from other forms of social 
organization, and what makes it a uniquely political entity, is its authority to 
decide that an enemy exists and that it must be fought with all of the society's 
resources. 38 By contrast, a political association whose unity consists of an ag-
glomeration of changing alliances among heterogeneous groups yields a consti-
tutional ethic that, according to Schmitt, must eventually dwindle to the 
proposition pacta sunt servanda [contracts must be observed].39 Such a politi-
cal association is based on a simple contract, and when that contract is breached, 
the result must be civil war.40 
The quintessential political distinction for Schmitt is that between friend 
and enemy. When states fail to make that distinction, other inequalities come to 
the fore, since there will always be some form of inequality in a group of peo-
ple.41 Thus the community is ultimately divided against itself if it does not unite 
against its enemies. "Political unity is the highest unity ... because it decides, 
and has the potential to prevent all other opposing groups from dissociating into 
33~ BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 19. 
34. CARL ScHMnT, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGiE II. DIE LEGENDE voN DER ERLEDIGUNG JEDER 
PouTISCHEN THEOLOGIE (1970); CARL ScHMITT, DER NoMos DER ERnE IM V6LKERRECHT DES Jus 
PuBLICUM EuROPAEUM (1950). For an overview of Schmitt's post-war thought, see Kervegan, supra 
note 22. 
35. The majority of the works by Schmitt that have been recently translated into English date 
from the 1920s and 1930s. These translations must be credited with a major role in the revival of 
interest in Schmitt in the English-speaking academic world. The most significant translations in-
clude CARL ScHMnT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans.,. 1996) 
(1923) [hereinafter ScHMTIT1 CRISis); CARL SCHMnT, PoLITICAL RoMANTICISM (Guy Oakes trans., 
1985) (1925) [hereinafter ScHMIIT, POLITICAL RoMANTICISM]; CARL ScHMITI, PoLmCAL THEOL-
OGY (George Schwab trans., 1985) (1922) [hereinafter ScHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY]; ScHMnT, 
THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17. 
36. Schmitt's analysis of pluralism is developed in Carl Schmitt, Ethic of State and Pluralistic 
State (David Dyzenhaus trans.) [hereinafter Schmitt, Ethic of State]; in CHALLENGE oF CARL 
ScHMnT, supra note 1, at 195. 
37. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 41-42. 
38. /d. at 45. According to Schmitt, a family or the head of a household may also be empow-
ered to make life or death decisions about members of that family or household, but only a state can 
make the decision that an enemy of the community must die. /d. at 47. 
39. Schmitt, Ethic of State, supra note 36, at 207. 
40. '~In the background of this kind of contractual ethic, an ethic of civil war always lurks." 
/d .. 
41. ScHt..-nrr, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMI'IT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 13. 
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a state of extreme enmity- that is, into civil war."42 Accordingly, the power to 
authorize war is the essence of Schmitt''s state. Schmitt justifies the recourse to 
war in straightforward, amoral terms: a state does not enter a war in order to 
further moral, economic, or religious principles. War is a response to an exis-
tential threat to the state and its people.43 
Schmitt's focus on the power to authorize war must be understood in the 
context of his theories of sovereignty and democracy. Schmitt's model of de-
mocracy is, at best, plebiscitary, drawing on Rousseau's concept of the general 
will, but stressing that a minority may well express ''the true will of the peo-
ple. "44 The people cannot be expected to form policy; they can only perform 
acts of acclimation, vote yes or no to questions posed to them by the sover-
eign.45 Schmitt did not consider parliamentarism to be a form of democracy 
because members of parliament are not directly answerable to the people.46 
Consequently, parliament does not always embody the popular will, and it can-
not speak for the people in the way that Schmitt's ideal sovereign can. 
Schmitt's theory of sovereignty is linked to his theory of decisionism - that 
is, his focus on the moment of crisis when the sovereign makes a crucial deci-
sion and, in exercising its will, removes from the populace not only other possi-
ble choices, but the very possibility of choices. 4 7 As Schmitt put it in the 
opening sentence of his 1922 work, Political Theology, "[s]overeign is he who 
decides on the exception.''48 Schmitt's focus on the importance of the strong 
and irrevocable act of political will makes sense in the context of Gennany's 
first attempt at parliamentary republicanism, an attempt that teetered colorfully 
on the brink of disaster for the entirety of its brief existence. Having struggled, 
along with others, to provide the fledgling Weimar Republic with a legal theory 
that could guarantee its stability, Schmitt arrived at the conclusion that the Sov-
ereign needed, in certain situations, to become the exception that cannot be 
bound by law.49 
Like J.G. Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, G.W.F. Hegel and the German 
social scientists whom they influenced, Schmitt takes state-building to be the 
42. Schmitt, Ethic of State, supra note 36, at 203. 
43. "If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to 
one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified.'; ScHMn"l', CRISIS, supra note 35; at 49. Schmitt's 
rhetoric clearly reflects Gerrnan disappointment with the punitive Versailles Treaty and what 
Gennans regarded as the hollow pieties of President Wilson's rhetoric during World War I. 
44. ld. at 27. 
45. Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 50 (citing Otto Kirchheimer, Constitutional Reaction in 
1932, in PoLmcs, LAw, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED EssAYS oF Orro KlRCHHEIMER 78 (Frede-
ric S. Burin & Kurt L. Shell eds., 1969)). 
46. ScHMnT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 34. 
47. Mouffe, Introduction., supra note 1 .. at 4-5. 
48. ScHMITI", PoLmcAL THEOLOGY, supra note 35, at 5. The Gennan version reads, 
"Souverail ist, wer iiber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet." ScHMITt, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, 
supra note 22, at ll. George Schwab's translation makes sense in the context of Schmitt's political 
theory, which plays on the literal meaning of the Gennan word for "state of emergency," Aus-
nahmezustand, which literally .means ''state of exception." 
49. CARL ScHMITT, PoLmCAL THEORY 5-15 (George Schwab trans., 1985). 
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key development of modem European history.50 The influence of Hegelian 
thought is especially pronounced in Schmitt's treatment of the state as the indi-
vidual expression of a particular people. 51 As he put it famously in the opening 
line of The Concept of the Political, ''[t]he concept of the state presupposes the 
concept of the political;"52 the state can only exist where a cohesive political 
community exists. 
Although Schmitt would allow the state to act outside the law only in ex-
ceptional circumstances where such actions were necessary in order to ensure 
political stability, his theory is incompatible with liberalism because, for 
Schmitt, the sovereign state's power to engage in exceptional, extra-legal acts is 
its very essence. 53 Furthennore, Schmitt's definition of politics is inextricably 
linked to the possibility of exceptional state action. "What always matters is the 
possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision 
whether this situation has or has not arrived."54 
Specifically, to Schmitt, war discloses the essence of every political idea: 
the distinction between friend and enemy.55 In most circumstances, he consid-
ers wars motivated by religion, morality, law or economics to be ''senseless."56 
The political may "derive its energy" from one of these antitheses, 57 but if an 
antithesis is strong enough to divide people into opposed groups of friends and 
enemies, it is transformed into the political. 5 8 But if the political does not con-
sist of some combination of these antitheses, how does a society tell its friends 
from its enemies? In order to give some content to his concept of the political, 
Schmitt needs to describe the nature of the community that unites against a foe, 
but he is elusive on this point.59 Drawing on classical and religious sources, 
Schmitt argues for the importance of the distinction between private and public 
enemies, between inimicus and hostis.60 The New Testament, according to 
Schmitt, told us to love our private enemies, not marauding Saracens and 
50. On the state-centered Gern1an tradition of political theory, see LEoNARD KRIEGER, THE 
GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM (1973). 
51. "In its literal sense and in its historical appearance the state is a specific entity of a peo-
ple." ScHMIIT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 19. 
52. /d. at 19. George Ananiadis, in his contribution to Mouffe's collection, presents the inter-
esting thesis that Schmitt's concept of the political derives from his concept of sovereignty. 
Ananiadis thus calls into question one of the fundamental building blocks of Schmitt's theory. See 
Grigoris Ananiadis, Carl Schmitt and Max Adler: The Irreconcilability of Politics and Democracy, 
in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMTIT, supra note 1, at 118. 
53. As John McCormick has shown, after 1922, Schmitt's political theory tended to justify 
permanent dictatorship by blurring the lines between exception and normal circumstances. See dis-
cussion infra accompanying notes 168·175. 
54. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 35. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. at 36. 
57. /d. at 38. 
58. /d. at 37. The Crusades were thus political, not religious wars for Schmitt. /d. at 48. 
59. "The question of what this substantial homogeneity should consist of is deliberately left 
open. One may think of common tradition, language, ethnic origin, religion, or ideology." Heiner 
Bielefeldt, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstruction and Countercriticism, 
in LAw AS PoLmcs, supra note I, at 27. 
60. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC V:XVI, 470). 
See also Ellen Kennedy, Hostis Not lnimicus: Towards a Theory of the Public in the Work of Carl 
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Turks. 61 In short, the essence of the political for Schmitt is that people fonn 
national groupings. Enmities inevitably arise among these groupings, and the 
state exists so that national groupings can protect themselves via warfare when 
their national existence is threatened. However, Schmitt never specifies the 
sources of national unity. He merely emphasizes the need for homogeneity. 
Schmitt's insistence on homogeneity is one of the more alarming aspects of 
his approach to politics. His notion of homogeneity differs from the blood-
based racism of the Nazis and their volkisch forerunners,62 but it may be just as 
sinister. For Schmitt, functioning democracy requires an existential unity of in-
dividuals who can work together as one political unit. Since the 19th century, he 
notes, national homogeneity has been the basis of that existential unity. 63 
Schmitt thus recognized that it might at times be necessary for a polity to ex-
clude heterogeneous elements.64 "A democracy demonstrates its political power 
by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that 
threatens its homogeneity."65 Enemies tend to be foreigners for Schmitt, but, as 
his later career would demonstrate, an enemy can also be a fellow national 
whose political ideas are considered a threat to the state. 
Accordingly, Schmitt rejected liberalism as a political system in which in-
dividual rights are prized and government is limited, and he rejected liberalism 
as a cultural system that prefers compromise to conflict and privileges individual 
interests over the group. 66 In his view, liberals do not understand the essence of 
politics, that is, that "[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions 
and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy."67 One may 
debate or compete with enemies, but Schmitt's concept of the political enemy 
emphasizes the ''ever-present possibility of combat."68 Schmitt is not being 
metaphorical: "The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real mean-
ing precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. "69 
One does not compromise with enemies; one seeks their annihilation. 
Schmitt, in LAw As PoLITICS, supra note 1, at 92, 101-04 (stressing that the distinction between 
friend and enemy in Schmitt's work is always a public matter). 
61. ScHMITT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 29 (citing Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27). 
62. In fact, the Nazi law professor, Otto Koellreutter, attacked Schmitt on the ground that his 
theories lacked the proper biological and volkisch foundations. See Orro KoELLREU ITER, YoLK UNO 
STAAT IN DER WELTANSCHAUUNG DES NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 6-11 (1935). 
63. Schmitt, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMn-r, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 14 (adapting Rousseau and arguing that those who do not belong to the 
nation must be excluded from the polity). Ulrich PreuB credibly argues that Schmitt's notion of 
homogeneity still exercises some influence over German constitutional discussions; for example, in 
debates regarding the eligibility of long-tenn non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. Ulrich 
K. PreuB, Political Order and Democracy: Carl Schmitt and His Influence, in CHALLENGE OF CARL 
ScHMrn·, supra note 1, at 171. 
65. ScHMITT, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9. 
66. See McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 6 (stating his thesis that Schmitt 
associated this type of liberalism with the use of technology as a neutral force that suppresses the 
political). 
67. ScHMIIT, THE CoNcEPT, supra note 17, at 26. 
68. /d. at 32. 
69. /d. at 33. 
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Schmitt contrasted his concept of the political with liberal pluralism, which 
he associated with "political romanticism. "70 The political romantic places 
nothing above her own individual interests and thus preserves an ironic detach-
ment from any serious political engagement. Political romantics engage in the 
endless discussion and formation of committees that are the essence, for 
Schmitt, of liberalism.71 They do this because they confuse politics with eco-
nomics and debate. They treat political opponents as competitors or as worthy 
adversaries, 72 and they attempt to adopt a neutral standpoint in the face of relig-
ious, ideological, and political conflicts. 73 
Schmitt also associated liberalism with parliamentarism- and, in his major 
work on the subject, he attributed the failure of modem parliamentary govern-
ments to the incompatibility of liberalism and parliamentary democracy.74 The 
tension between liberalism and parliamentarism derives from that between 
equality and democracy.75 Liberalism values the former over the latter, and by 
seeking to level all differences within a population, it ultimately blinds itself to 
the one difference that for Schmitt really matters, the distinction between friend 
and enemy. Schmitt insisted that equality is always achieved by establishing an 
attendant inequality, but a democracy "can exclude one part of those governed 
without ceasing to be a democracy."76 Schmitt thus considered universal suf-
frage to be a liberal, not a democratic idea,77 and he treated Bolshevism and 
fascism as anti-liberal but not necessarily anti-democratic movements.78 
Schmitt attacked not only the idea of liberal parlimentarism but also its 
practice.79 One of the central themes of his Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 
is the extent to which parliamentarism no longer conforn1s to the principles it 
espouses. 80 Assuming a position that has endeared him to the political left, 
Schmitt viewed liberal parliamentarism as a means of safeguarding the interests 
of the liberal bourgeoisie. Such government in the service of one sector of the 
population is incompatible with Schmitt's conception of sovereignty resting in 
70. See generally ScHMITT, PoLITICAL RoMANTICISM, supra note 35. 
71. According to Schmitt, faced with the question,. "Christ or Barrabas?'' liberals would set up 
a committee of inquiry~ SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, supra note 22~ at 78. 
72. ScHMIIT, CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28. 
73. Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 24. 
74. SCHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35. 
75. See Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy [hereinafter 
Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox], in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMrrr, supra note 1, at 38, 40 ("The 
liberal conception of equality postulates that every person is, as a person, automatically equal to 
every other person. The democratic conception, however; requires the possibility of distinguishing 
who belongs to the demos and who is exterior to it .... "). 
76. ScHMITT, CRISis, supra note 35, at 9. 
77. /d. at 11. 
78. Id. at 16. 
79. See Reinhard Mehring, Liberalism as a uMetaphysical System": The Methodological 
Structure of Carl Schmitt's Critique of Political Rationalism, in LAw AS POLITICS, supra note l, at 
131, 132 ("What interested Schmitt was th~s not the liberal world view as such ... but the political 
idea of liberalism as it emerged through its actual institutionalization."). 
80. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 41-42 (summarizing Schmitt's criticisms of 
functioning parliamentarism). 
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the will of the people. 81 Schmitt could tolerate no impediments to the exercise 
of sovereignty in accordance with the popular will, not even constitutional prin-
ciples~ The purpose of the political in Schmitt's system is the protection of the 
particular existence and identity of the nation. To the extent that formal legal 
rules prevent the state from embodying the will of the people, constitutionalism 
undennines the exercise of democratic authority. 82 
Schmitt developed his legal and political ideas in response to the crisis in 
Weimar constitutionalism. As elections yielded no consensus on a desirable 
for1n of government, paramilitary organizations affiliated with various political 
parties took to the streets~ Political violence rose, and faith in the rule of law 
declined. Schmitt despaired of the ability of legal positivism to provide a foun-
dation for a stable system of law. He theorized that the proper basis for such 
stability was in national homogeneity and in a leap of faith. The state, embody-
ing the popular will, must be empowered to act on that will in emergency situa-
tions, even if such action contradicts the established rule of law. 
C. The Rediscovery of Schmitt by the Academic Left 
Before he joined the Nazi Party, and even for a time thereafter, Schmitt was 
widely read and often cited with approval by political theorists from across the 
political spectrum. 83 Schmitt's reputation revived, first in Germany, and then in 
the United States, as political theorists on the left searched for new perspectives 
from which to attack the dominant liberal paradigm in a world in which Marxist 
critique seemed increasingly beside the point. Although Schmitt's name was 
already familiar to some American academics, the current American interest in 
Carl Schmitt really took off after the (then) leftist-oriented political journal, 
Telos, published an exchange between Ellen Kennedy and scholars with exper-
tise in the Frankfurt School. Kennedy emphasized the extent of Schmitt's im-
portance to heroes of the academic left such as Walter Benjamin and Jiirgen 
Habermas. 84 The interest of Schmitt's contemporaries on the left in his theories 
provieds the grounds for the current interest in Schmitt's work. 
Schmitt's leftist contemporaries, including representatives of the neo-Marx-
ist Frankfurt School, took Schmitt very seriously and attempted to make use of 
his criticisms of liberalism, although they were certainly aware of Schmitt's po-
litical orientation.85 However, in assessing Schmitt's influence on leftist think-
ers, we should keep in mind that the Weimar Republic produced some of this 
century's most eclectic thinkers, thinkers who could not help but be influenced 
81. Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 27. 
82. ld. at 28. 
83. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2 (noting citations with approval of Schmitt by 
Carl Friedrich and by numerous members of the Marxian Frankfurt School); Strong, supra note 19, 
at x-xii (same). 
84. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 42-45, 56-64. 
85. Ellen Kennedy shows not only that Frankfurt School members Franz Neumann, Otto 
Kirchheimer, and Walter Benjamin acknowledged their indebtedness to Schmitt's political theories 
but also that, at least in Benjamin's case, later editors attempted to destroy the evidence of this 
influence. /d. at 44. 
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by the politics of the times, in which radical leftists and the anti-democratic 
forces on the right borrowed tactics and rhetoric in their separate attacks on the 
forces of liberal parliamentarism. Walter Benjamin's works reflect numerous 
influences ranging from Theodor Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's critical the-
ory, to Bertolt Brecht's more straightforward materialism, to Gershom 
Scholem's version of Jewish mysticism.86 It is not surprising- and not necessa~ 
rily very significant - that Schmitt's works informed Benjamin's analysis of 
17th-century sovereignty in his first book, The Origins of German Tragic 
Drama.87 
Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann incorporated Schmitt's theory of 
politics into more central aspects of their own political theories, but they adapted 
Schmitt in ways that clearly served their radical materialist politics. Neumann 
accepted Schmitt's concept of the political as involving the recognition of 
friends and enemies. For Neumann, however, the "fundamental contradiction in 
Germany today is the economic contradiction, . ~ . that of labor and property 
• . . ~ " 88 Otto Kirchheimer replaced Schmitt's idealist notion of homogeneity 
with his own materialist version, calling for social and economic homogeneity in 
order to eliminate sources of conflicts within a democracy.89 However, repre-
sentatives of the Frankfurt School stopped offering positive ·assessments of 
Schmitt's work after the Nazi seizure of power, when the dangers of Schmitt's 
theories became clear and ·the chances of their successful incorporation into left-
ist theory accordingly diminished.90 
86. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Introduction, in WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS (1968) 
(providing both a sympathetic account of Benjamin'-s work and a discussion of the numerous influ-
ences on his thought). Benjamin's tour-de-force essay on ''The Work of Art in the Age of its Tech-
nical Reproduction:" takes as its central theme the need to respond to the fascist aestheticization of 
politics by politicizing aesthetics. Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner techischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit, in 2 WALTER BENJAMIN_, WERKAUSGABE 736 (1980). 
87. WALTER BENJAMIN, URSPRUNG DES DEUTSCHEN TRAUERSPIELS ( 1928). See Kennedy, Carl 
Schmitt, supra note 2, at 43-44 (pointing out Benjamin's use of Schmitt). Kennedy's evidence of 
Schmitt's influence on Benjamin is not overwhelming. Both were influenced by George Sorel's 
Reflections on Violence, id. at 43, but that does not mean that Benjamin followed Schmitt. Benjamin 
sent Schmitt a sycophantic letter, announcing. the publication of his Origins of Getman Tragic 
Drama. This act tells us more about academic politics more than it does about Schmitt's influence. 
In any case, Schmitt appears to have been unimpressed with Benjamin's appropriation of his theo-
ries. /d. at 44 and n. 22. 
88. /d. at 47 (citing Neumann's letter to Schmitt of Sept. 2, 1932, in REFoRM UND REsiGNA-
TION: GESPRACHE irnER FRANZ L. NEUMANN 79 (Rainer Erd ed., 1985)). 
89. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 48. Kennedy acknowledges that, after von 
Papen' s coup in 1932, Kirchheimer concluded that parliamentary democracy was the only form of 
• 
government that could function in a time of social and national heterogeneity. /d. at 53. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 54 (noting Herbert Marcuse's denunciation .of Schmitt's anti-liberalism and 
the shift in the Frankfurt School's focus towards a critique of fascism). Although Gennan political 
theorists approached Schmitt critically after his collaboration with the Nazis, they did not neglect 
him entirely. See generally DIRK VAN LAAK, GESPRACHE IN DER SiclffiRHErr DES ScHWEIG:E~s: 
CARL SCHMITT IN DER POLffiSCH:EN GEISTESGESCHICHTE DER FRUHEN BUNDESREPUBLIK (1993) (dis-
cussing the influence of Schmitt's legal and political theory on the founders of Germany's post-war 
constitutional democracy). Kennedy and Ulmen make much of Haberrnas' frequent acknowledg-
ment of Schmitt's importance. See e.g., Ulmen, supra note-2, at 1127 (sharing Habermas' assess-
ment of Schmitt as a legitimate pupil of Weber); Kennedy,. Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 56-64 
(arguing that Schmitt's influence on Habermas' early work is especially strong). But it should be 
obvious that Habern1as' communicative action theory represents precisely the brand of liberalism 
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It is easy to see why leftists committed to class struggle would be attracted 
to Schmitt's politics of antagonism. It is harder to explain Schmitt's appeal to a 
generation of scholars who fight their battles in lecture halls and academic jour-
nals rather than at the barricades and in the streets.91 Moreover, in their enthusi-
asm for Schmitt's theories, Schmitt's promoters engage in a certain degree of 
willful blindness to his faults. In Mouffe's collection, Paul Hirst explains 
Schmitt's three-year collaboration with Nazism as motivated by his preference 
for order over chaos. "[P]olitical thought should not be evaluated on the basis of 
an author's personal political judgements. Thus the value of Schmitt's work is 
not diminished by the choices he made. ''92 Hirst's statement is both conclusory 
and wrong. 93 Schmitt's biography does not require that the left refuse to inves-
tigate the possibility of using Schmitt's theories to attack an ossified version of 
liberal dernocracy,94 but the value of Schmitt's work is defined by the political 
choices he made, especially since he always justified his personal political deci-
sions in tern1s of his own theory. 95 
The revival of interest in Schmitt among scholars today, many of whom are 
influenced by both post-modern and Marxist theory, indicates a search for new 
ways to chalJenge the liberal political model whose dominance over political 
theory has never been more secure.96 For Ellen Kennedy, the first question is 
that Schmitt abhors, and Habennas' comments on Schmitt have been largely critical. He denounced 
the renewed American interest in Schmitt as evidence of a new conservatism. JDRGEN HABERMAS, 
Die Schrecken der Autonomie: Carl Schmitt auf Englisch, in HABERMAS, EINE ART ScHADEN-
SABWICKLUNG 103 ( 1987). 
91. It is thus not surprising that Schmitt's theories never held an attraction for the most tradi-
tionally academic representatives of the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. 
See Jay, supra note 2, at 73-74 (discussing Adorno's rejection of Schmitt as "undialectical"). 
92. Hirst, Schmitt ·s Decisionism, supra note 19, at 8. 
93. Enst-Wolfgang Bockenforde adopts a more understandable position that one can focus ,on 
the ~'work" rather than the "person." Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, The Concept -of the Political: A 
Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in LAw AS POLITICS, supra note I, at 
37. However, the editor of that volume points out that it is not so easy to separate· the person from 
the work in the case of Carl Schmitt. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at 3. 
94. See Maus, supra note 22, at 200 (warning against trying to explain all of Schmitt's work in 
terms of his changing political viewpoints). 
95. Oren Gross provides a fine corrective to Hirst in a "personal noten that he appends to his 
discussion of Schmitt: 
There are ti'mes when academics do not enjoy the privilege of not taking sides and not 
expressing positions. And when they do, thelr words and actions matter and they 
stand accountable for them. Carl Schmitt expressed his positions clearly and acted 
upon them. All those who continue to debate· his legacy must remember at all times 
that this is not some exercise conducted in the ivory towers of academia with which 
we are involved. It is a matter of life, and even more so, of death. "[T]heoretical 
discussions never take place in a vacuum and there can be no philosophical thought 
without political consequences." 
Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Pow-
ers and the "Norm·Exception" Dichotomy, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825, 1867-68 (2000) (quoting ZEEV 
STERNHELL eta/., THE BIRTH OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY: FROM CULTURAL REBELLION TO POLITICAL 
REVOLUTION 250 ( 1994)). 
96. See Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism, supra note 19, at 7 ("Political argument has been 
virtually reduced to contests within liberal-democratic theory."). 
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whether the left can make positive use of Schmitt's critique of liberalism.97 
However, implicit in the invocation of Schmitt's concept of the political is a 
critique not only of contemporary liberalism, but of contemporary critical the-
ory. Thus in introducing a special issue of Telos devoted to Schmitt, the editors 
attack the "lame socialism of Suarez, Mitterand, and Craxi,"98 and the "obses-
sive left-liberal pursuit of egalitarianism as a super-legal norm [with] debilitat-
ing consequences both in theory and in practice."99 To the extent that critical 
theory is unable to "articulate a meaningful political theory," the Telos editors 
argue, it has been "stymied by precisely those issues raised by Schmitt." 100 
However, the scholars who seek to use Schmitt today are no longer com-
mitted to class struggle as the engine of social transformation. They therefore 
cannot reproduce the materialist surgery that Kirchheimer and Neumann per-
formed. Indeed, while the Frankfurt School sought to use Schmitt's critique of 
liberalism to smash liberalism, Mouffe seeks to use Schmitt to foster liberal self-
critique.101 The essays on Schmitt that appeared in Telos used his work to high-
light weaknesses in critical theory. 102 Mouffe finds Schmitt especially useful in 
problematizing the pluralistic view of democratic citizenship: he challenges lib-
erals to formulate the "commonality" that underlies a political community in 
such a way as to preserve religious, moral and cultural pluralism. 103 While 
Scheuerman's work indicates ways in which Schmitt's theories can contribute to 
a leftist critique of liberal jurisprudence, and Law as Politics indicates Schmitt's 
historical significance as well as his lingering influence on Gennan law and 
politics, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt demonstrates that political theorists have 
yet to articulate the ways in which Schmitt's attacks on liberalism can contribute 
to a revival of radical politics, or even foster liberal self-critique in ways that 
liberalism cannot on its own. 
II. 
INSERTING CARL SCHMITT INTO THE AMERICAN DISCUSSION OF 
PoLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
The three books under review here present three very different views on the 
question of Schmitt's relevance to contemporary theory. Mouffe's authors ap-
proach Schmitt, in Mouffe' s words, as "one of the great political and legal theo-
97. Kennedy, Rejoinder, supra note 2, at 102. Kennedy believes that the question should be 
answered in the affinnative, as there is no other way to explain the attraction of Schmitt's theories to 
"some of this centuryt s most influential leftist theorists .... " /d. 
98~ Piccone and Ulmen, supra note 1, at 4. 
99. /d. at 5. 
100. /d. at 3. TELos' role as the chief disseminator of Schmitt's ideas to an English-language 
audience, together with its attacks on both liberalism and critical theory, has led many of its readers 
to conclude that the turn to Schmitt reflects the editors' decision to transform TELOS into a neo-
conservative journal. 
101. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 38, 52, n.2. 
102. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2; Kennedy, Rejoinder, supra note 2; Ulmen and Pic-
cone, supra note 1. 
103. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 50. 
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rists of this century." 104 Many of the essays do not directly discuss Schmitt's 
ideas or his influence but simply treat him in relation to other leading political 
theorists. The authors collected in Dyzenhaus' collection offer a narrower as-
sessment of Schmitt's relevance to contemporary political and legal theory. 
However, as Dyzenhaus writes in summary of the essays he has edited, the writ-
ers tend to fault Schmitt, especially for "the paucity of his own positive 
thought." 105 Scheuerman offers the most focused assessment, inserting 
Schmitt's analysis of the problem of underdetermination into the North Ameri-
can debate regarding underdetern1ination and its consequences. 
Because the authors in Mouffe's collection generally accept that Schmitt's 
importance has been established, they do not discuss why it is important to read 
him today. Four essays that create a central section of this compilation treat 
Schmitt in relation to other thinkers. Jorge Dotti' s essay is an explication of 
Marx as read by Schmitt. 106 Grigoris Ananiadis' contribution explains the at-
traction Carl Schmitt had for the Austro-Marxist, Max Adler, one of the first to 
use Schmitt in order to criticize the political mainstream from the left. 107 Cathe-
rine Colliot-Thelene's essay compares Schmitt with Max Weber. 108 These es-
says are solid pieces of the traditional variety of intellectual history that assesses 
the impact of one body of work on another. However, readers who are not 
already convinced of Schmitt's contemporary significance might wonder why 
they should care how the fascist Schmitt interpreted Marx and Weber. 109 Only 
David Dyzenhaus' essay in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, which focuses not on 
Schmitt but on John Rawls and Hermann Heller, assesses Schmitt's significance 
as a political theorist. 110 Dyzenhaus concludes that, while there is some value in 
Schmitt's diagnosis of the ills of the modern parliamentary system, his solutions 
must be rejected. As a result, Dyzenhaus recommends that we focus our atten-
tion on Schmitt's contemporary, the social democrat, Hermann Heller. 111 
Ulrich PreuB also seems to think that the focus on Schmitt is inappropriate. 
Surveying the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe, he concludes that Schmitt's 
"significance is clearly bound to a particular historical epoch which is about to 
vanish." 112 
l 04. Mouffe, Introduction, supra note 1, at 1. 
105. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note 1, at 17. 
I 06. Jorge E. Dotti, From Karl to Carl: Schmitt as a Reader of Marx, in CHALLENGE OF CARL 
ScHMITT, supra note 1, at 92. 
107. Ananiadis, supra note 52, at 118. 
108. Catherine Colliot-Thelene, Carl Schmitt versus Max Weber: Juridical Rationality and Ec-
onomic Rationality, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMrrr, supra note 1, at 138. 
109. All of these essays are significant pieces of scholarship. As they do not address the theme 
of this review essay, however, I will not discuss them at length. Dotti and Colliot-Thelene do not 
address the question of Schmitt's significance to contemporary theory. Ananiadis' comparison of 
Schmitt and Adler is intended to "caution [readers] regarding the possible uses of Schmitt." 
Ananiadis, supra note 52, at 118. 
110. David Dyzenhaus, Putting the State Back in Credit, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMnT, 
supra note 1, at 75. 
Ill. /d. at 85-89. 
112. PreuB, supra note 64, at 178. 
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In the introduction to Law as Politics,-Dyzenhaus explains the recent inter-
est in Schmitt in the United States in terms of an attempt by North American 
s.cholars to understand the traditional German academic field of study, Staat-
slehre, a discipline that analyzes the development of states bound by the rule of 
law. 113 · · Dyzenhaus nonetheless finds it "perplexing" and "disturbing'' that 
Schmitt is the practitioner of Staatslehre whose writings have received the most 
attention.114 Still, the choice of Schmitt is not without its justifications. To the 
extent that contemporary liberal theory builds on John Rawls' works on political 
theory, 115 liberal theory endeavors to establish overlapping values on which ~11 
members of society can agree regardless of their individual conceptions of the 
good life. 116 Schmitt rejected the notion that values could be established in the 
abstract. Rather, values express the essence of a specific community. Schmitt 
thus makes possible an attack on Rawlsian liberalism that begins by questioning 
its basic assumptions. 
Scheuennan begins helpfully by pointing out the basic ingredients of the 
liberal conception of the rule of law. "According to the mainstream of modern 
liberal theory, the rule of law at a minimum requires that legal nonns be ( 1) 
general in character, (2) relatively clear, (3) public, (4) prospective, and (5) sta-
ble." 117 Liberal theory struggles to· reconcile these principles with the increas-
ing realization that necessary forms of state economic intervention inevitably 
result in the exercise of discretionary powers by judges and administrators.118 
Consequently, the law is underdetertnined, and contemporary legal theorists de-
bate both the extent and the consequences of this underdetermination. The most 
common response to the challenge of legal underdeterrninacy is the fonnalist 
approach, which recognizes that certain "hard cases" will be decided in the in-
terstices between formal rules but is satisfied that legal rules can ,guide adminis-
trators in the vast majority of cases. 119 More troubled by the underdeterminacy 
of legal rules, legal realists argue that legal rules provide inadequate guides to 
political decision-makers. 120 
According to Scheuennan, thinkers as diverse as Richard Posner and Ron-
ald Dworkin reach the same conclusion as the legal realists, but they look to 
external sources of objectivity and unifortnity in order to regularize legal deci-
sion-making processes. For Posner, the laws of economics guide legal reason-
ing; for Dworkin, judges apply the law coherently when they interpret the law to 
accord with the political morality of the community .121 Critical legal theorists 
are so suspicious. of the discretion exercised by the government that they find 
113. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at I. 
114. !d. at 1. Dyzenhaus touts Hennann Heller as the Weimar legal theorist whose. positive 
program might provide more clues about the solutions to the kinds of problems facing liberal theo-
rists today. /d. at 17, 19, n.38. 
115. JOHN RAwLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). 
116. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note 1, at 15. 
117. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 4. 
118. /d. at 5. 
119. I d. at 6. 
120. /d. at 6-7. 
121. ld. at 7. 
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legal indeterminacy to be the inescapable rule. 122 For legal theorists wrestling 
with the problem of underdetennination, Scheuerman argues, Schmitt provides 
both a useful analysis of the problem and an object lesson in the dangers that can 
arise when one concludes that liberalism cannot provide a mechanism for avoid-
ing arbitrary uses of legal authority. 
A. Schmitt and Political Theory 
1. Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism and Contemporary Political Theory 
One virtue of The Challenge of Carl Schmitt is that it includes a number of 
contributions by scholars whose writings on Carl Schmitt have not, to my 
knowledge, been hitherto available in English. Jean-Franc;ois Kervegan, an ex-
pert on Hegelian philosophy and the importance of Hegel's work to an under-
standing of Schmitt, provides a synoptic overview of Schmitt's corpus, focusing 
on his post-war "geopolitical" writings. 123 Kervegan's work is informative, fo-
cusing on themes to which North American scholarship has been largely inatten-
tive. To the extent that Kervegan explicates texts that are not widely available 
in English, his essay will prove valuable to political theorists interested in 
Schmitt but unable to read him in the original. Although Kervegan finds 
Schmitt's critique of globalization and imperialism illuminating, however, he 
does not present Schmitt's analysis as either a model or a challenge for left-wing 
politics. Consequently, his . essay does not really advance the discussion of 
Schmitt's relevance to contemporary critical theory, as the collection's title and 
Mouffe' s introduction suggested. 124 
Unfortunately, the remaining essays in Mouffe's compilation also do not 
illuminate the challenge of Carl Schmitt - or why we should regard him as an 
especially useful critic of contemporary liberal theory. Mouffe's own contribu-
tion comes closest. Mouffe finds compelling Schmitt's illumination of the ten-
sion between democracy and liberalism. 125 Schmitt illuminates this tension by 
stressing the demos at the heart of democracy. Based in the people, democracy 
requires both homogeneity, and, "if the need arises," the eradication of heteroge-
neity.126 Mouffe wants to use Schmitt in order to develop a more realistic ap-
proach to a pluralistic view of democratic citizenship. In her view, liberals have 
chosen simply to disregard the problem of how a pluralistic society decides on 
principles of inclusion and exclusion. 127 Mouffe cautions liberals to heed 
Schmitt's warnings regarding the need to have a substantive basis for the demos. 
She fears that liberals tend to favor globalized citizenship and that, stripped of 
122. /d. at 7-8. 
123. See Kervegan, supra note 22. 
124. The grounds for Mouffe's decision to include in this collection re-prints of Hirst's 12-year 
old essay and PreuB' seven-year old essay are mysterious. 
125. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 38. 
126. ScHMrrT, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9. 
127. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 50-51. 
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their roots in a demos, liberals will lose their democratic rights. 128 In short, 
Mouffe thinks that liberalism requires the nation-state. 129 She accepts Schmitt's 
insights regarding the tension between liberal and democratic conceptions of 
equality, but argues that "[t]he democratic logic .of constituting the people, and 
inscribing rights and equality into practices, is necessary to subvert the tendency 
towards abstract universalism inherent in liberal discourse." 130 Mouffe argues 
that Schmitt has not found the fatal flaw in liberal theory. Rather, she treats 
Schmitt as having discovered a productive tension at the heart of liberalism. 
The tension is not easily resolved, but "[l]iberal-democratic politics consists, in 
fact, in the constant process of negotiation and renegotiation - through different 
hegemonic articulations - of this constitutive paradox." 131 
It is undeniable that liberal theory has struggled to establish the framework 
within which the liberal doctrine of equality applies. But .contemporary liberal 
theory ably addresses the difficulty of reconciling liberal nationalism with lib-
eral cosmopolitanism. 132 Mouffe posits that democracy is endangered because 
of modem liberalism's "incapacity to conceptualize" a frontier between "us" and 
"them,"133 but this need not be the proje.ct of liberalism or of any political ideol-
ogy. Mouffe argues that liberalism needs to confront Schmitt's call for homoge-
neity. She simply states: ''[Schmitt] is right to say that a political democracy 
cannot be based on the distinctionlessness of all mankind, and that it must be 
rooted in a specific people."134 The resurgence of 19th_century nationalisms in 
the late 201h-century provides us with ample evidence that a far more promising 
project is that of eradicating irrelevant or mythical distinctions among people 
who can be united in the service of common political goals. 135 
128. Mouffe begins her contribution to The Challenge of Carl Schmitt by criticizing the advo-
cates, such as David Held and Richard Falk, of "cosmopolitan citizenship." Mouffe, Schmitt and the 
Paradox, supra note 75, at 39. 
129. /d. at 41-42. 
130. ld. at 43. 
131. /d. at 44. 
132. For example, compare the very interesting writings of Will Kymlicka, who struggles to 
reconcile liberal and national goals, WILL KYMLICKA, STATES, NATIONs AND CuLTURES (1997) (ar-
guing that tensions rarely arise between individual rights and group rights); WILL KYMLICKA, MuL-
TICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (attempting to reconcile 
' . 
a theory of minority group rights with ·the liberal focus on individual rights) with Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRmCAL INQUIRY 617 (1997) (attempting to reconcile cosmo-
politanism with nationalist patriotism)~ 
133. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 43. 
134. Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy, in LAw AS PoLIT-
Ics, supra note 1, at 159, 161. This is the same essay that appears in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL 
ScHMI:rr, but Mouffe tempered the language when she re-printed her essay. In the re-printed ver-
sion, the line reads, "(Schmitt] is right to say that a political democracy cannot be based on the 
generality of all mankind, and that it must belong to a specific people.'' Mouffe, Schmitt and the 
Paradox, supra note 75, at 40. Mouffe must have noticed that her invocation of "rootless" cosmo-
politanism brought her political theory uncomfortably close to that of volkisch nationalism. 
135. Jiirgen Habennas has promoted the idea of constitutional patriotism to supplant more tradi-
tional fonns of national identification. In the light .of the on-going integration of the western Euro-
pean states into the European Union, there is reason to think that Haberrnas' idea is no mere 
pipedream. See, e.g., JDRGEN HABERMAS, A BERLIN REPuBLic: WRITINGS ON GERMANY (Steven 
Rendall trans., 1997) (including a number of essays on Gennan unification and the specter of a 
renewal of German nationalism). In contrast to Mouffe; John McCormick argues that we need to be 
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Given that even some of the authors she collects reject Schmitt as a theore-
tician from whose insights the left can profit, 136 Mouffe's introduction is intel-
lectually bullying. Mouffe treats as a foregone conclusion Schmitt's importance 
to her readership. 137 For Mouffe, if not for the authors she has assembled, it is 
clear that Schmitt is to be read and is to be read for one purpose - in order to 
"bring the crucial deficiencies of the dominant liberal approach to the fore." 138 
In his contribution to Mouffe's collection, Ulrich PreuB insists that Schmitt's 
work "still has some significance for us." 139 Unlike Mouffe, however, PreuB 
supports his argument for Schmitt's significance with an analysis of post-war 
Germany's constitutional system in which he highlights that system's indebted-
ness to elements of Schmitt's thought. 140 PreuB' essay also demonstrates 
Schmitt's peculiar relevance to discussions of German constitutional theory. 141 
He makes no attempt to argue for Schmitt's broader relevance to the problems 
posed by political liberalism . 
..., 
Slovej Zizek's essay epitomizes the main problem with The Challenge of 
Carl Schmitt: its authors tend to use the occasion of a collection of essays pur-
portedly on Carl Schmitt to write on other topics. Zizek' s begins helpfully 
enough, informing us that Schmitt is a "modem" thinker because of "the gap 
between the act of decision and its content."142 Conservative modernism is 
grounded for Zizek on a paradox in that it requires a return to unconditional 
authority, but that authority cannot be grounded on positive reasons. 143 While 
Zizek' s analysis is not inappropriate as a description of Schmitt's thought and its 
"' problems, it is not clear why Zizek thinks these tendencies and problems are 
unique to modem thought or to conservative modernism. In any case, after this 
"" brief introductory commentary on Schmitt, Zizek returns to his more familiar 
familiar with Schmitt's legal theory precisely because we might be witnessing a new chapter in the 
battle between liberal democratic forces and the forces of fascism or military dictatorship in Central 
Europe. Liberalism needs to be on guard against Schmittian ideas because they may well inform 
sophisticated new forn1s of totalitarian government. McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRmQUE, supra note 
1, at 13. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
137. Mouffe's conclusory statement, "[t]hat Schmitt is one of the great political and legal theo-
rists of this century is now widely recognized," would likely come as a surprise to the majority of 
American practitioners of both political and legal theory. Mouffe~ Introduction, supra note 1, at 1. 
138. /d. at 2. 
139. PreuB, supra note 64, at 155. 
140. /d. at 165-72. 
141. Specifically, PreuB points out the residue of Schmitt's decisionism in the Gennan constitu-
tional court's characterization of the Basic Law as making fundamental constitutional decisions re-
flecting the political will of its authors to privilege certain values. /d. at 165. PreuB also notes that 
the German constitution, unlike those of other modem democracies, is not a constitutive document. 
That is, while the U.S. constitution brings into being a political entity that could not exist without it, 
the Gennan Basic Law merely preserves a pre-existing order. /d. at 168-170. PreuB provides a very 
useful analysis. My only caveat is to caution that Schmitt is not the only possible source for these 
elements of the Gennan Basic Law, and I do not think that PreuB intended for us to believe that 
Schmitt's theories alone can account for the major differences between Gennan and U.S. 
constitutionalism. 
"' 142. Slavoj Zizek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMnT, 
supra note 1, at 18, 20. 
143. /d. 
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themes- Derrida's and Lacan's analyses of religion and theater- and the first 
stream-of-consciousness burst of his essay culminates in the singularly unedify-
ing insight that Antigone is a bad model for anti-fascist resistance. 144 
Zizek suggests that reference to Carl Schmitt is "crucial in detecting the 
deadlocks of post-political liberal tolerance." 145 Schmitt would have us re-in-
..... 
sert real political antagonisms into our political systems. Zizek approves of this 
gesture but also seeks to control it by equating the universal with the "militant, 
divisive position of one engaged in a struggle." 146 Zizek' s universalism does 
not entail universal tolerance but the "passionate struggle for the assertion of the 
Truth which compels ... " that struggle. 147 While Schmitt's position is con-
..... v 
servative, Zizek insists that his own is radical. Be that as it may, in Zizek's 
essay, the problems posed by Schmitt serve as little more than a point of depar-
ture for a discussion of the theories of Freud, Lacan, and Derrida. Although 
v 
Zizek returns to Schmitt periodically in the remainder of his essay, he does so in 
order to remind his readers, since they have probably forgotten, that the topic at 
hand is Carl Schmitt. Ultimately, Zizek does not really write about Schmitt at 
all. He uses the space allotted to him to further develop his own philosophical 
v 
system. Zizek' s system is a world unto itself, and this is not the place in which 
..... 
to assess it. In any case, Zizek' s contribution does little to illuminate the 
thought of Carl Schmitt. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the purpose of 
..... 
including an essay by Zizek in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt was not to im-
prove our appreciation of Schmitt but to move merchandise by capitalizing on 
the current popularity of Zizek' s brand of theorizing. 
The Challenge of Carl Schmitt thus fails to clarify why Schmitt's critique 
of liberalism should be of especial interest to us today. In her earlier collabora-
tion with Ernesto LaClau, Mouffe embraced a Gramscian model of politics that 
synthesized theory and real political developments into a stimulating alternative· 
to liberalism. 148 No longer interested in pursuing a Gramscian approach, 
Mouffe looks to a right-wing thinker to provide a perspective on liberalism that 
she could easily have found, in her pre-post-Marxist days, in the writings of left-
wing thinkers. Nowhere is this more obvious than in her critique of Habertna-
sian deliberative democracy, in which she faults communicative action theory 
for replacing an economic model of politics with a moral one. 149 While Mouffe 
previously wrote as a radical critic of liberalism, she now seeks to use Schmitt's 
diagnosis in order to cure liberalism. But Schmitt's critique, to the extent that it 
is not based on a distorted perspective on liberalism, tells liberals only about 
weaknesses that they could have discovered without Schmitt's aid. 
144. /d. at 20-21. 
145. ld. at 35. 
146. /d. 
147. /d. 
148. ERNESTO LACLAU and CHANTAL MouFFE, HEGEMONY AND SociALIST STRATEGY (1995). 
149. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 44-46. 
• 
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2. The Flaws and Limitations of Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism 
Schmitt criticizes parliamentarism on the ground that actual parliaments do 
not exemplify the values of liberalism. He despairs of parliamentary govern-
ment because the parliaments he has studied do not engage in the sort of in-
formed, disinterested, unconstrained political debate that is, according to liberal 
theory, to result in reasoned governance and the rule of law. Schmitt thus de-
spairs of the possibility of the rule of law based on such "empty formalism.'' 150 
However, Scheuerman points out that liberalism thrives despite the limitations 
of working parliaments because liberal society gives rise to a public sphere in 
which the values. .of free exchange and debate can be realized.151 Schmitt's 
critique of liberalism is not irrelevant; parliamentary government would be im-
proved if parliamentary deliberation were more respectful of the principles of 
liberalism. However, the technical imperfections in the functioning of liberal 
democracy do not undermine the aims of liberal parliamentarism. Schmitt un-
derestimates both the resiliency of the parliamentary system and the power of 
the extra-parliamentary public sphere to hold in check the illiberal excesses of 
parliament. 
Several of the essays collected in Law as Politics provide helpful character-
izations as well as commentaries on Schmitt's critique of liberalism. What dif-
ferentiates these commentaries from those of many of the authors collected in 
The Challenge of Carl Schmitt is the historical specificity with which they ap-
proach the question of Schmitt's significance. The essays in Law as Politics 
treat Schmitt as a thinker confronting the legal and political issues of his day. 
They stress both the brilliance of Schmitt's analysis and the limited applicability 
of his approach. 
According to Heiner Bielefeldt, Schmitt's critique of liberalism can be di-
vided into two contradictory parts. First, liberals cannot simultaneously adopt 
the nortnative principle of neutrality and embrace the rule of law and constitu-
tional de.mocracy. Second, liberals are hypocrites because they hide behind their 
universal principles in order to promote their own economic goals. 152 Schmitt 
criticizes liberals for having no values and for promoting the values associated 
with their economic interests. But Bielefeldt points out that liberal theory distin-
guishes between neutrality as to norms (Wertneutralitiit) and neutrality as to 
world~vie.ws (Weltanschauungsneutralitiit). The state is not permitted to dis-
criminate among people on the basis of their world-views - that is, on the basis 
of their particular religious or non-religious convictions. 153 Thus while liber-
alism preserves the normative idea of ''respect for the dignity of every human 
being as a morally autonomous subject,"154 liberalism, at least in the Kantian 
150. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 60. 
151. /d. at 57. 
152. Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 24. 
153. /d. at 29. 
154. /d. at 30. 
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variant that Bielefeldt defends, does not embrace Wertneutralitiit because the 
morally autonomous individual is still subject to the categorical imperative. 155 
As to liberal hypocrisy, as Scheuennan repeatedly points out, Schmitt relies 
on an idealized version of 191h century liberalism in order to contrast modernity 
with 19th-century models and to demonstrate the inadequacy of those models for 
the purposes of modem governance. Schmitt posits that state intervention in 
technological and economic fields represents a new encroachment by the state 
into the private sphere. But no state was ever neutral with regard to economic 
developments in the way liberal theory conceived that it ought to be. Central 
European economies in the 19th century were driven by state interventions, and, 
while the welfare state was not yet fully developed, the provision of basic social 
welfare was already a well-established function of the state. 156 
Dominique Leydet provides a slightly different characterization of 
Schmitt's critique of liberal parliamentarism, dividing it into a refutation of the 
liberal conception of politics and a demonstration of the obsolescence of parlia-
mentarism in the face of the development of mass democracy. 157 While Leydet 
recognizes that Schmitt wrote with the various crises of the Weimar Republic in 
mind, she treats his critique of pluralism as a more generalized response to "the 
transfonnation of the nineteenth-century state toward the 'total state.'" 158 
Schmitt believed that the problems of pluralism could be resolved only by either 
recognizing the superior authority of the state over pluralistic associations or by 
subordinating the state to those organizations and thus leaving political out-
comes to be detennined by the compromises among opposing interests. Leydet 
points to a possibility that Schmitt did not consider: that the process of recon-
ciling diverse interests is the foundry in which the common will is forged. 159 
Schmitt did not consider this possibility because of two assumptions in his 
analysis of pluralism. First, Schmitt assumes that political parties are simply the 
mouthpieces of sectional interests. 160 Second, Schmitt assumes that parliament 
only seeks to mediate among divergent interests through rational public discus-
sion. 161 For Leydet, Schmitt's first assumption is inaccurate as an empirical 
matter. Parliamentary governments differ from corporatist bodies precisely be-
cause political parties act with a certain degree of autonomy from the economic 
interest that they seek, in part, to represent. 162 
• 
Leydet counters Schmitt's second assumption with reference to Kelsen, 
whose analysis of the workings of parliamentary democracy she prefers. 163 Cit-
155. /d. 
156. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at I 09-110. . 
157. Dominique Leydet, Pluralism and the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, in LAw AS 
PoLITICS, supra note I, at I 09. 
158. /d. at 110. 
159. /d. 
160. /d. at 118. 
161. /d. at 119. 
162. /d. at 118-19. Schmitt's analysis of the problems of parliamentary governments does not 
work well with respect to the major political parties of the United States. These parties do not 
purport to represent particular sectoral interests, but seek to represent the same sectoral interests. 
163. /d. at 119-20. 
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ing Kelsen's Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 164 Leydet notes that major-
ity parties cannot simply ignore the interests of minority parties and still expect 
the minority parties to participate in the parliamentary game. 165 Thus, even if 
there were a perfect overlap between political parties and economic interests, 
that overlap would not produce the results that Schmitt predicted. Parliamentary 
government survives because it provides many means through which different 
social groups can air their views, confront their political opponents, and promote 
the implementation of policies that serve their interests. Schmitt argues that 
because political liberalism does not promote rational decision-making, it must 
devolve into an irrational struggle among competing interests. Leydet finds a 
logic in modem parliamentarism and concludes that the rationality of discussion 
is preserved because "parliamentary debates serve as a public test for policies" 
and because policies still must be "justified on the basis of certain shared princi-
ples." 166 Leydet, following Habermas, also points out that, while Schmitt as-
sumes that parliaments can only function through rational deliberation, modem 
parliaments communicate with both their political opponents and their constitu-
encies through various techniques, of which rational deliberation is merely one 
example. 167 
In his very focused commentary on the development of Schmitt's idea of 
dictatorship, John McCormick proposes that Schmitt came to accept the need for 
a pennanent dictatorship in response to the threat of communism. 168 In his 
1921 book on dictatorship, Schmitt had traced the idea of dictatorship back to its 
Roman origins and advocated temporary dictatorship as an efficient response to 
a temporary state of emergency. 169 Schmitt called this form of dictatorship 
"commissariaL''170 Schmitt criticized liberals for treating all dictatorship as per-
manent - that is, as synonymous with Caesarism - and he admired the Bol-
sheviks for their understanding of dictatorship as a temporary stage on the road 
to communism. 171 In his work of the following year, Politische Theologie, 
Schmitt embraced the notion of the dictator as a sovereign, capable of embody-
ing the will of the people. 172 This same concept of sovereignty embodied in a 
dictator, infortned Schmitt's writings throughout the Weimar Republic. 173 In-
creasingly, as the crisis of the Weimar Republic deepened, Schmitt muddied the 
distinctions he had made between normal and extraordinary constitutional oper-
. 
164. HANs KELSEN, VoM WESEN uNo WERT DER DEMOKRATIE (1929). 
165. Leydet, supra note 151, at 119. 
166. Id. at 126. 
167. /d. at 120-23. 
168_. McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 234. 
169. ScHMITI, DIE DIKTATUR, supra note 22. 
170. McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 218-22. 
171. Id. at 220. 
172. ScHMITT, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, supra note 22; McCorn1ick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, 
supra note 22, at 226; 229. 
173. McCorn1ick specifically discusses the role of dictatorship in CARL ScHMrrr, VERFASSUNG-
SL.EHRE (1928); CARL ScHMnT, DER HOTER DER VERFASSUNG (1931), CARL ScHMn"I", LEGALITAT 
UND LEGITIMITAT (1932). McConnick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 230. In the 
context of the Weimar constitutional scheme, the role of dictator fell to the President, in this case, 
the increasingly senile General Paul von Hindenburg. 
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ations. 174 The state of emergency came to define the essence of sovereignty for 
Schmitt. 
McConnick concludes that three lessons can be drawn from Schmitt's the-
ory of dictatorship: (1) liberal constitutional theory has been inadequately atten-
tive to the problem of exceptional situations; (2) the notion of sovereignty ought 
to be uncoupled from constitutional provisions for emergency powers; and (3) 
there ought to be a constitutional distinction between who determines that a state 
of emergency exists and who is empowered to act in such emergency situa-
tions. 175 These are indeed problems that liberal theory ought to confront. In the 
United States, for example, courts often invoke the "political question" doctrine 
and thus avoid addressing questions of judicial limitations on the exercise of 
executive powers in crisis situations. 176 Ultimately, however, McCormick re-
jects Schmitt's reduction of the question of sovereignty to the exceptional situa-
tion. The exception reveals, according to McConnick, only that classical 
liberalism was naive about constitutional emergencies. If emergency powers 
endure, the constitution will not. 177 
Jeffrey Seitzer, in his contribution to Law as Politics, joins Scheuennan, 
Dyzenhaus, McCormick and other political theorists who encourage us to read 
Schmitt in order to avoid repeating his mistakes. 178 Seitzer argues that 
Schmitt's approach to legal theory is primarily concerned with compensating for 
the specific defects of Weimar constitutionalism, 179 and he recommends that we 
be wary lest the new constitutions being devised for Central and Eastern Europe 
be implemented in accordance with Schmitt's legal theory. 180 Seitzer' s essay 
concludes Law as Politics, and it is a fitting way for the collection to end. It 
summarizes the general approach taken in that volume: treating Schmitt as a 
serious but dangerous thinker whose writings should not be ignored, both be-
cause they challenge liberal theorists to strengthen their defenses of their princi-
ples and because Schmitt articulates the unspoken premises of anti-democratic 
constitutionalism. 
B. Schmitt in Conversation with Contemporary American Legal Theory 
One of the weaknesses of Mouffe' s collection is that it repeatedly addresses 
a liberal orthodoxy without specifying the contours of the liberal credo. William 
Scheuertnan, by contrast, places Schmitt into a useful conversation with contem-
porary liberal legal theory by specifying the challenges that liberal legal theory 
faces and by pointing out Schmitt's relevance to those challenges in his work, 
174. McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 235. 
175. /d. at 237. 
176. For critical commentaries on the political question doctrince, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
PoLITICAL QuESTIONs/JuoiCIAL ANsWERs: DoEs THE RuLE oF LAw APPLY TO FoREIGN AFFAIRS 8 
(1992); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). 
177. McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 239-240. 
178. Jeffrey Seitzer, Carl Schmitt's Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: Veifassung-
slehre as a Response to the Weimar State Crisis, in LAw AS PoLmcs, supra note 1, at 281. 
179. /d. at 281. 
180. Jd. at 282. 
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Carl Schmitt: The End of Law. Scheuertnan understands the attraction of 
Schmitt to contemporary legal theorists based on Schmitt's attention to problems 
that contemporary liberalism needs to address. But he also points out that too 
many of those responsible for the recent revival of interest in Schmitt overlook 
that for Schmitt the crisis of parliamentarism was part of a broader crisis of legal 
indeterminacy. 181 Schmitt's political theory needs to be viewed in the context 
of his legal theory. 
Schmitt identified legal underdetertninacy as the Achilles heel of liberal 
legal theory, and he attempted to exploit that weakness to undennine liberalism 
entirely. Scheuennan acknowledges the force of Schmitt's anti-liberal critique, 
but he also provides two important caveats. First, while Schmitt demonstrates 
the difficulties involved in trying to resolve the problem of underdetern1inacy, 
his writings only ought to have relevance for those who share his conclusion that 
underdetertninacy is widespread and unavoidable. Second, Scheuennan points 
out that Schmitt "consistently relied on idealized and downright misleading in-
terpretations of classical liberal political and legal ideals as instruments for 
mocking contemporary liberal democratic aspirations."182 Whether or not 
Schmitt's critique of the liberalism of his time is convincing, Scheuer1nan as-
serts that it certainly falls far short of doing justice to the idiosyncracies of post-
Cold-War politics. Furthern1ore, it is difficult to see how the left can make use 
of Schmitt's solution to the problem of underdetenninacy, which was to guaran-
tee legal regularity through the promotion of homogeneity in the judiciary and 
acquiescence in the exceptional decisions of the sovereign. 183 While grappling 
with the problem of indeterrninacy, Schmitt abandoned hope for democratic 
governance and developed a theory of dictatorship that he believed was the only 
means of resolving that indetenninacy. 184 However, Scheuern1an reminds us 
that Schmitt's concept of the political focuses on the crisis situation and thus 
underemphasizes the everyday politics of negotiation and peaceful in-
terchange.185 If Antigone is a bad model for anti-fascist resistance, Schmitt may 
be an equally bad model for a critique of a functioning liberal democratic 
government. 
181. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 39. 
182. /d. at 18. 
183. According to Scheuertnan, this theme was recognizable even in Schmitt's earliest writings. 
/d. at 24. 
184. /d. at 34. Scheuer rnan agrees with John McConnick that Schmitt acknowledged the utility 
only of temporary dictatorships in 1921 but fully embraced authoritarianism one year later. See 
discussion supra accompanying notes 168-175. 
185. S c HEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 46. In his contribution to Law as Politics, Ernst-Wolfgang 
Bockenforde points out that Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction has relatively little application to 
domestic politics. In any case, Schmitt's concept of the political was descriptive rather than norma-
tive. Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl 
Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in LAw AS PoLITics, supra note 1, at 37, 38. However, Bock-
enforde acknowledges that Schmitt allowed his theory to be applied as a nonnative theory of domes-
tic politics throughout his lifetime, and that those who seek to make use of his theories today clearly 
have domestic politics in mind. 
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1. Temporal and Theoretical Limitations of Schmitt's Critique 
Schmitt's jurisprudential writings in the 1920s culminated with a book on 
constitutional theory, Die Verfassungslehre,l 86 in which he attempted to show 
that liberal, parliamentary government is incapable of giving rise to the rule of 
law because the parliament itself is arbitrary and unregulated. 187 Scheuerman 
follows Leo Strauss in pointing out that Schmitt's "critique of liberalism takes 
place within the horizon of liberalism,'' 188 but Scheuerman provides further 
specificity: the liberalism in question is that of Hans Kelsen' s legal positivism. 
Schmitt'B demolition of liberal theory extends. only to liberalism as theorized by 
Kelsen. 189 Classical liberalism boasted lofty normative goals, but Kelsen split 
legal norms off from moral nonns, and liberalism consequently devolved into a 
mode of "bourgeois relativism." 190 
Schmitt's attempt to use Kelsen's theory as a metonym for the entirety of 
the liberal political tradition lacks historical grounding. Schmitt presents a juris-
prudentiaVphilosophical critique of liberalism, but he does not and cannot show 
that liberalism has historically devolved into the sort of anti-normative system 
that he associates with Kelsen.191 Ultimately, Scheuerrnan concludes, because 
Schmitt is trapped within Kelsen' s model of constitutional theory, he cannot get 
beyond the principles of liberal constitutionalism. However, because Schmitt 
replaces Kelsen' s pure theory of law with a pure theory of will that ultimately 
gives rise to a fonn of authoritarianism legitimized through plebiscitarianism, 
Schmitt abandons the best features of the liberal model. 192 
In the 1930s Schmitt began to develop his critique of liberalism into a the-
ory of the total state. Schmitt traces the tension in nineteenth-century European 
governments as legislative bodies, run by career administrators, came to usurp 
executive power. As the legislative state increasingly supplants the executive 
. . 
state, the divide between state and society is eliminated, and the state increas-
ingly intervenes in economic and social functions previously within the realm of 
an autonomous civil society. 193 In the modern technological age, the state must 
master economics and technology in order to retain its political power!94 But 
as the legislative state, subject as it is to the influence of antagonistic interest 
groups, gains control over the economy and technology, the indeterminacy of its 
legal decisions becomes increasingly threatening to the rule. of law. Rather than 
attempting to theorize a revival of the rule of law, Schmitt chooses to discard the 
liberal model, as "inconsistent with the structural imperatives of our times."195 
186. CARL ScHMI'I"I', DIE VE~FASSUNGSLEJ-IRE (1928) [hereinafter ScHMITr, VERFASSUNGS-
LEHRE]. 
187. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 61. 
t 88. Leo· Strauss, Comments on Carl Schmitt's Be griff des Politischen, reprinted in ScHMITI, 
THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 83, 105. 
189. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 62. 
190. Id. at 64 (quoting ScHMI'I"r, VERFASSUNOSLEHRE, supra note 186, at 67). 
191. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8; at 65-66. 
192. /d. at 82-83'. 
193. Id. at 89 ... 90. 
194. Id. at 92-93. 
195. /d. at 97. 
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Schmitt finds dictatorship better suited to modernity because in that form of 
government arbitrary action is taken as a given. 196 
Schmitt arrived at his position through a number of steps, all of which are 
subject to criticism. The first step is the position that Schmitt shares with con-
temporary radicals, that is the position that the law is underdetennined and that 
judges and administrators are unavoidably empowered to make arbitrary deci-
sions. Scheuennan expresses no view as to whether or not this is correct, but he 
points out that while contemporary theorists accept underdeterrrtination as the 
inevitable outcome of the adntinistration of laws, Schmitt treated un-
derdetertnination as a problem that could be solved. 197 Instead of addressing the 
accuracy of Schmitt's assessment of the extent of the problem of legal un-
derdetermination, Scheuertnan criticizes the second step, Schmitt's solution to 
that problem. Seeing pluralism as the source of the failures of modem parlia-
mentarism, Schmitt concluded that legal determinacy could be re-established 
only by a caste of ethnically homogeneous ')udicial experts dedicated to an 
equally homogeneous world view." 198 For Schmitt, writing after 1933, this 
meant that all laws were to be interpreted according to the intellectual spirit of 
National Socialism.199 Although Scheuertnan acknowledges Schmitt's complic-
ity in the successful introduction of legal determinacy in Germany through the 
imposition of Nazi values on the law,200 he also points out that Schmitt was a 
victim of the limitations of his theory. Ethnic homogeneity does not guarantee 
legal detertninacy. His ethnic brethren ousted Schmitt from his leadership posi-
tions within the Nazi hierarchy, in part because they disagreed with his ideas 
about the law.201 
Scheuerman concludes that, with respect to contemporary legal theory, 
Schmitt is most useful as a case study: "[t]he case of Carl Schmitt clearly contra-
dicts the naive assumption shared by some jurists today that 'liberating those 
who wield legal power from the 'mistaken' belief that legal doctrine constrains 
their actions will have progressive effects. '"202 I agree with Scheuerman that 
both legal and political theorists should derive from their study of Schmitt a 
heightened awareness of the dangers of certain theoretical possibilities that left-
wing legal theory has explored. Scheuertnan does not treat Schmitt's critique of 
liberalism as a source that can be mined in the interests of a new approach to 
political theory. Rather, he focuses on pointing out the dangers of following 
Schmitt's approach to its logical conclusions. But those who advocate a return 
196. /d. 
197. /d. at 137-38. Scheuerrnan characterizes the position that "all cases are hard" as "problem-
atic in its own terms" and notes that "[l]egal nihilism and liberal democracy hardly make good 
bedfellows." /d. at 138. 
198. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 126-27 (explicating CARL ScHMilT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, 
VOLK, supra note 32). 
199. ld. at 131. 
200. /d. at 136-37. 
201. /d. at 134-35. 
202. /d. at 139 (quoting RoBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 66-67 
(1996)); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 571 
(1983). 
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to Schmitt do not adopt his conclusions. They see in Schmitt a novel approach 
to problems confronting contemporary theory, and they seek to use his insights 
to address weaknesses in liberal theory. 
2. Schmitt and the Internationaliz-ation of Law 
Schmitt's writings on international law expand on his critique of un-
derdetenninacy. Because Schmitt believed that international law could never 
represent a functioning international political community, Schmitt believed that 
no form of international law could ever win recognition as a legitimate and de-
terminate system of adJudication. Consequently, Schmitt believed international 
law to be either impossible or to be a mask for liberal imperialism. 203 As 
Scheuerman points out, Schmitt's writings on international law suffer from a 
fundamental internal tension. On the one hand, Schmitt criticizes the hypocrisy 
of U.S. foreign policy and of international law as practiced through the liberal 
League of Nations. On the other hand~ Schmitt clearly envies the successes of 
American imperialism.204 Ultimately, Scheuerman concludes that Schmitt's 
writings during the Third Reich on international law were part of his attempt to 
revive his career as the leading theorist justifying Nazi imperialism.205 
Schmitt's preference for the state system over intematjonal regimes seems 
uniquely dated and should make him especially unattractive to the left. Despite 
the horrific revival of 19th century style nationalisms in the Balkans and in the 
forrner Soviet Union, developed countries are increasingly sacrificing powers 
once considered inseparably bundled with national sovereignty in order to par-
ticipate in multinational treaty organizations and international regimes.206 Carl 
Schmitt simply does not speak to our time when he says "rationally speaking, it 
cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the 
friend and enemy antithesis, [and] that the distinction still remains actual to-
day .. ~ ."207 The Hobbesian model of international relations that Schmitt adopts 
cannot account for the European Union, for the World Trade Organization, or 
for the remarkably peaceful way in which the Cold War reached its conclusion. 
I do not mean to indicate that violent national antagonisms have disappeared; 
rather, I merely point out that political progress can be made precisely by setting 
aside the antiquated friend/enemy model that Schmitt recommends and that the 
left-wing Schmittians seem to endorse. Whether the left-Schmittians like it or 
not, the world does not seem bound to return to an age where states alone make 
203. See id. at 141-73 (summarizing Schmitt's writings on international law). 
204. /d. at 162. 
205. /d. at 161. 
206. For discussions of the extent to which national states have agreed to sacrifice their sover-
eignty and participate in international organizations, see THOMAS FRANCK, SoVEREIGNTY AND LEGIT-
IMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs (1995); CHAYES and CHAYES, THE NEw SovEREIGNTY (1994). 
Although the United States' federal system complicates its participation in international regimes, it 
too has shown signs of a new willingness to participate. For a discussion of this development and 
the continuing problems the United States faces in reconciling its dual sovereignty with participation 
in international regimes, see the essays collected in DELEGATING STATE PowERs: THE EFFECT OF 
TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SovEREIGNTY (Thomas Franck ed., 2000). 
207. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28. 
158 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:127 
politics and where politics is ultimately defined by the possibility of war. If 
such a return were to occur, one can only wonder how the left would profit from 
it. 
III. 
CoNCLUSION: PossiBILITIES FOR A NoN-SCHMITTIAN LEFTIST 
CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 
Ulrich Preu6 puts his finger on the peculiarity of the sudden love affair 
some "political theorists identified with the Left" have taken up with Carl 
Schmitt. Schmitt's "intellectual originality consisted in the uncompromising 
and unrivalled radicalism with which he tried to preserve the values of nine-
teenth-century bourgeois order under conditions of mass democracy and its so-
cial and political struggles during the frrst half of the twentieth century. "208 I 
find PreuB' analysis persuasive in two ways. First, he identifies Schmitt's long-
term political interests with materialist specificity. Second, he comprehends that 
Schmitt's theories are time-bound and cannot be ripped from their proper con-
text and mechanisitically applied to address the problems facing contemporary 
liberal democracies. 209 
Should we read Carl Schmitt today? I think law students and legal scholars 
can benefit from his writings in a number of ways. First, Schmitt's theory of the 
exception relates to a problem to which liberal theory has given inadequate con-
sideration. Liberal theory recognizes that there are gaps in the law and that 
decision-makers sometimes have to act in the interstices between clearly estab-
lished laws. However, liberal theory has little to say about those exceptional 
circumstances when the law may be suspended or where legal precedents cannot 
properly apply. As John McConnick points out, here Schmitt poses the ques-
tion, but his proposed solution, replacing parliamentary democracy with a dicta-
torship, is not one that liberalism can accept. 
Second, Schmitt forces liberals to theorize the substance underlying our 
political community. There is no need to define this community in tenns of 
Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction, but the law ought to be an expression of the 
political community that it governs. Liberal theory strives for tolerance and in-
clusiveness, but there are clearly areas, such as national security law and the 
laws affecting naturalization and citizenship, in which the law makes crucial 
distinctions between those who are included and those excluded from the polity. 
208. PreuB, supra note 64, at 178. 
209. G.L. Ulmen, one of Schmitt's most energetic apologists, shares Preu6' assessment: 
The lessons to be learned from European constitutional crises always must be circum-
scribed and qualified by this fundamental distinction [between the continental Euro-
pean tradition of codified law and the English tradition of common law], even as one 
must distinguish between continental European and North American concepts of lib-
eralism and conservatism, both of which have changed over time .. In short, the crisis 
of Gennan constitutional law during the Weimar Republic is a very precarious and 
problematic paradigm for considering and criticizing either American or Canadian 
legal and political matters. 
Ulrnen, supra note 2, at 1121. 
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Liberal theory would do well to take up the Schmittian challenge and justify the 
principles of exclusion that underlie these laws. To use Schmitt in this way is to 
work within the liberal paradigm and, as Mouffe suggests, to use an anti-liberal 
critique in an effort to strengthen democratic institutions. 
Such a project is very different from Schmitt's and from the earlier at-
tempts by the left to appropriate Schmitt's theories in an attempt to replace lib-
eral democracy with a radical alternative. While Schmitt's writings can be used 
to inform a radical critique of liberalism, they make far more sense when read in 
their proper historical context, which means, among other things, that Schmitt 
must be read in conjunction with the German legal theorists to whom he was 
responding. Not only does such an intertextual reading of Schmitt illuminate his 
writings, it indicates his specificity and his limitations. Schmitt's constitutional 
theory was a response to a genuine crisis in the German republic. It is important 
to know why a brilliant conservative legal theorist came to see National Social-
ism as a preferable alternative to Weimar's imperfect republicanism. It is also 
important to know that many of Schmitt's contemporaries saw those imperfec-
tions with the same clarity that Schmitt did but chose professional disgrace and 
exile over collaboration with Nazism. The choices they made were not merely 
personal; they derived from deeply-held beliefs about constitutional theory. 
The left has nothing to gain from the abandonment of civility in politics in 
favor of the brutality of Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction. This does not mean 
that the left need accept modes of pluralism that are too prone-to degenerate into 
unprincipled horse-trading. Rather, especially in the face of the over~the-top 
individualism of identity-politics, the left must adopt a strategy of forceful but 
respectful disagreement, not only because the left undoubtedly would come out 
on the losing end of a politics of antagonism but, more fundamentally, because 
-people on the left cannot demonize those who do not share their political views 
without betraying leftist principles regarding the ontological equality of all per-
sons. More specifically, Mouffe's recommendation that the left use Schmitt in 
order to develop a notion of homogeneity that can form the basis for a pluralistic 
demos seems especially inappropriate for countries such as the United States and 
Canada in which the state has always been conceived as a political idea capable 
of uniting heterogeneous groups. It is especially hard to apply Schmitt's empha-
sis on homogeneity in a country such as the United States, in which the indepen-
dent judiciary serves to protect minority rights and to guarantee the rights of 
citizenship to members of heterogeneous groups. 
In the United States, there is an additional problem facing the left that is 
quite different from the problem of underdetermination that Scheuerman empha-
sizes. The trend in federal statutes in the areas of criminal and immigration law, 
including laws governing the writ of habeas corpus, is to establish very clear and 
draconian rules and to eliminate- both discretion and, in many cases, judicial 
review in an Article III court. 210 These laws prevent the federal courts from 
210. See e.g., The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death-Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat 1214 (1996) (limiting the availability of habeas review in federal courts); the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.I 04-208, div. C, II 0 Stat. 1009-546 
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performing their role as the guardians of the constitutional rights of protected 
minority groups. Left-wing critics of legal indeterminacy must also confront the 
fact that unjust laws that are clear and leave no room for discretion can also pose 
a threat to the social values leftists seek to protect. Legal positivism may pro-
vide insights into how one might fortnulate a left-wing critique of recent legisla-
tive decisions that have curtailed the powers of courts to protect the rights of 
individuals. In order to discover such insights, however, legal scholarship must 
look beyond Carl Schmitt. 
(1996) (rendering numerous categories of "criminal aliens" ineligible for discretionary relief from 
deportation and largely eliminating federal judicial review of decisions committed to the discretion-
ary power of the Attorney General). 
